LINGUISTIC DETERMINISM AND ARTIFICIAL LANGUAGES

The aim of this paper is to present the relation of linguistic determinism (and, to a lesser extent, of linguistic relativism) and artificial language. In the introductory part we will explain the basic notions of the theory of artificial languages and linguistic determinism, while we will look at these concepts in the analysis of selected artificial languages. The languages presented below (Laadan, Loglan, Basic English, Newspeak) were chosen based on their author’s accentuated linkage to linguistic determinism (for example, two of them state that the reason for creating a language is Whorf’s hypothesis testing) or basic principles / goals that are based (tacit) acceptance of some form of linguistic determinism. In addition, each of these languages has different goals and philosophy, enabling observation of the relationship between language and linguistic determinism from a different angle. Moreover, some of the languages have raised additional philosophical questions (such as Laadan) with the specificity of their ideas, and for that reason given more places within the work. In short, the paper is based on several key questions: 1. If linguistic determinism proved to be correct, what consequences would each of the artificial languages have on the thought of an individual / culture in general? 2. What do the theories and criticisms of the studied languages speak about the possible omissions of linguistic determinism? 3. What is the problem that arises from the discussion of the mentioned languages about the omissions of critics of linguistic determinism? 4. Are the changes (utopian or distal) predicted that the language will really cause the consequences of linguistic determinism or some other process? 5. What are the consequences of insisting on experimental proof of linguistic determinism on its articulation and presence in philosophy? Artificial language is defined as a language developed by an individual or a small group and is intended to be an international
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language or designed for a more specific purpose but is not intended to function as the mother tongue of its users.

It is added that all the artificial languages in common are that rules and precise definition of vocabulary come before the use of the language. Also, there is a clear difference between artificial and formal languages. In formal languages, each element and each combination has a clearly defined unambiguous meaning (as in the chemical formula, for example), and the simplicity of pronunciation of such formulations is not taken into account. On the other hand, artificial language is not expected to understand the meaning of the word unambiguously from the meaning and arrangement of its constituent parts, nor does the sentence always be unequivocally defined by the words it creates – the possibility of using the context and the common sense reduce the requirement of the criterion. Artificial languages can be divided into a priori and a posteriori languages. A priori languages are those whose words (in a formal sense) are not based on any of the existing languages – such as Laadan. A priori languages are sometimes referred to as philosophical languages as some of them, besides morphine modifications, also want to radically differently assign meaning to words or segment reality in a different way. On the other hand, a posteriori language uses either one language for your podium (say Basic English or Newspeak) or combine several of them (Logan or Esperanto). They are divided into simplified languages (Basic English), naturalistic languages (which are close to natural languages, most often Latin) and autonomous languages, which borrow morphs of natural languages, but prior to the grammar level. In addition to artificial and formal languages, certain authors also mention the term 'created' languages, whose purpose is to create a certain meaning in narrative works. Such languages do not have to be complete – they can consist of only a few words, but it is considered that by referring only a few examples of such an incomplete language can be achieved the presentation of the worldview that is in the background.
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Two of the languages that we will present below are created as languages, but one of them (Laadan’s native language) develops into an artificial language, while Orwell’s Newspeak never comes to such degree of maturity (nor is it, given the philosophy it transposes, intended to be).

However, such a created language is involved in this work because of its relevance for the discussion of linguistic determinism. Artificial languages are specific to their relationship with meaning. Namely, very often (as we will see below), artificial languages are a sort of utopian project of language creation that will perfectly translate desired meanings - concepts, tone of message, rationality of the court - or help to create a clear structure of meaning. Such projects often originate from the "common sense" ideas that in the artificial language a particular lexical unit should be created that will refer to something in our living experience, more or less specific. However, theories of meaning suggest that such ideas open up certain problems - the relationship between language, reality, mind and meaning is complex and up to now unclear. Given the extent and dissatisfaction of the problem, the following work will be limited to emphasizing the non-critical use of the idea of referentiality of a particular author and its consequences for his / her theory. Apart from the problem of meaning, artificial languages also face the problem of sociability. Namely, one of the main features of natural languages is their sociability - they are formed through (more or less equally) communication between different individuals, communities, societies, peoples and classrooms. It can be concluded that the lack of such a common creation is what artificial languages make different from natural languages, at least in their initial stages. In order to make the phenomenon of sociality of language and alternative interpretation of meaning connected with philosophy, we will refer to the later period of philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially when discussing the phases (accepted) of artificial language, and the theorizing of indirect sociability, which the artificial language project can lead to in question.
Also, the social nature of language is especially important for distinct views, which criticize the creation of artificially modified languages by the ruling / dominant party.

Linguistic determinism is defined as a hypothesis that states that "language influences thought or is completely determined, and that due to the fact that language is shared by a community of speakers, language influences or determines ways of thinking of a particular culture." The strong version of linguistic determinism claims that the language is completely determined by the thought, while the weak claims to only affect the thought. More specifically, the language most often implies morph-syntactic elements (but may be pragmatic or phonological), while thought / mind implies (depending on the subtheme) perception, attention, classification of reality, memory, creativity, or aesthetic judgment. Linguistic relativism is the theory that languages can differentiate between them at all levels (hence, there is nothing that would necessarily be common in all languages). Although linguistic relativism often equates to linguistic determinism, they are actually independent terms that can (but not necessarily) be part of the same theory. Some form of linguistic determinism has existed in the undefined form of romanticism (such as Herder) or Wilhelm von Humboldt, its clear line of development begins in the first half of the 20th century with anthropologist Franz Boas. Franz Boas (1911) publishes his hypothesis that language reflects the thought - that different cultures and their lifestyles support (and need) different grammatical forms and vocabulary. It should be noted that this view is in no case a linguist determinism, neither weak nor strong, but simply a hypothesis opposed to universalism.
REFERENCES

